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Abstract 
Creative processes are widely believed to involve the 
generation of multiple, discrete, well-defined possibilities 
followed by exploration and selection. An alternative, 
inspired by parallel distributed processing models of 
associative memory, is that creativity involves the merging 
and interference of memory items resulting in a single 
cognitive structure that is ill-defined, and can thus be said to 
exist in a state of potentiality. We tested this hypothesis in an 
experiment in which participants were interrupted midway 
through solving an analogy problem and asked what they 
were thinking in terms of a solution. Naïve judges categorized 
their responses as AP if there was evidence of merging 
solution sources from memory resulting in an ill-defined idea, 
and SM if there was no evidence of this. Data from frequency 
counts and mean number of SM versus AP judgments 
supported the hypothesis that midway through creative 
processing an idea is in a potentiality state.  
Keywords: analogy, creativity; divergent thinking; ill-
defined idea; insight; interference; intuition; potentiality; 
structure mapping. 
Introduction 
Creative ideas take time to mature. It is widely assumed 
that this process involves searching through memory and/or 
selecting amongst a set of predefined candidate ideas. For 
example, computer scientists have modeled the creative 
process as heuristic search (e.g. Simon, 1973, 1986). In 
psychology, there is much evidence for, and discussion of, 
the role of divergent thinking in creativity (Guilford, 1968; 
for a review see Runco, 2010). Divergent thinking is 
presumed to involve the generation of multiple, often 
unconventional possibilities. Thus construed, it necessarily 
goes hand-in-hand with selection, since if you come up with 
multiple alternatives you eventually weed some of them out. 
Many well-known theories of creativity, such as the 
Geneplore model (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992), and the 
Darwinian theory of creativity (Simonton, 1999) involve 
two stages: generation of possibilities, followed by 
exploration and ultimately selective retention of the most 
promising of them. However, the generation stage of 
creative thinking may be divergent not in the sense that it 
moves in multiple directions or generates multiple 
possibilities, but in the sense that it produces a raw idea that 
is vague or unfocused, that requires further processing to 
become viable. Similarly, the exploration stage of creative 
thinking may be convergent not in the sense that it entails 
selecting from amongst alternatives but in the sense that it 
entails considering a vague idea from different perspectives 
until it comes into focus. The terms divergent and 
convergent may be applicable to creative thought not in the 
sense of going from one to many or from many to one, but 
in the sense of going from well-defined to ill-defined, and 
vice versa. We hypothesize that although a creative process 
may involve search or selection amongst multiple 
possibilities, it need not, and selection need not figure 
prominently in a general theory of creativity (Gabora, 2005, 
2010).  
A central and ubiquitous facet of human creativity is 
analogy (Gentner, 2010; Mitchell, 1993). Analogies are 
widely believed to involve two elements: a source, which is 
well understood, and a target, which is less well understood 
but which shares elements with the source. One might 
suppose that because analogy does not (in general) require 
that one come up with something new so much as find a 
source in memory that is structurally similar to the target, it 
is the creative process most likely to involve search or 
selection. Thus if we can show that even analogy problem 
solving involves not search or selection amongst predefined 
alternatives but the resolution of ill-defined states of 
potentiality, we have fairly strong evidence for the 
hypothesis that potentiality states figure prominently in the 
creative process. This paper presents an analogy problem 
solving experimental test of this. 
Rationale for the Approach 
Ontologically, selection amongst multiple well-defined 
entities entails a different formal structure from actualizing 
the potential of a single, ill-defined entity (Gabora, 2005; 
Gabora & Aerts, 2007). Cognitively, thinking of a single 
vague idea seems relatively straightforward, whereas it is 
not obvious that one could simultaneously hold in one’s 
mind multiple well-defined ideas. But perhaps the strongest 
reason to suppose that creativity involves, in the general 
case, not selection amongst multiple ideas but the honing of 
a half-baked idea, is that it is consistent with the structure of 
associative memory (Gabora, 2010). Because memory is 
sparse, distributed, and content-addressable, knowledge and 
memories that are relevant to the situation or task at hand 
naturally come to mind (e.g. Hinton, McClelland, & 
Rumelhart, 1986; Kanerva, 1988). Neural cell assemblies 
that respond to the particular features of a situation are 
activated, and items previously encoded in these cell 
assemblies (that have similar constellations of features and 
activate similar distributed sets of neurons), are evoked. 
Both the vagueness of a ‘half-baked’ idea and the sense that 
it holds potential, as well as its capacity to actualize in 
different ways depending on how one thinks it through, may 
be side effects of the phenomenon of interference. In 
interference, a recent memory interferes with the capacity to 
recall an older memory. A similar phenomenon occurs in 
neural networks, where it goes by different names: 
‘crosstalk’, ‘superposition catastrophe’, ‘false memories’, 
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‘spurious memories’, and ‘ghosts’ (Feldman & Ballard, 
1982; Hopfield, 1982; Hopfield, Feinstein, & Palmer, 1983). 
Interference is generally thought of as detrimental, but it 
may be of help with respect to creativity. A half-baked idea 
may be what results when two or more items encoded in 
overlapping distributions of neural cell assemblies interfere 
with each other and get evoked simultaneously. We will 
refer to the phenomenon of interference leading to creative 
ideation as creative interference. When an idea emerges 
through creative interference, the contributing items are not 
searched or selected amongst because together they form a 
single structure. This structure can be said to be in a state of 
potentiality because its ill-defined elements could take on 
different values depending on how the analogy unfolds. It is 
proposed that this unfolding involves disentangling the 
relevant features from the irrelevant features by observing 
how the idea looks from sequentially considered 
perspectives. In other words, one observes how it interacts 
with various contexts, either internally generated (think it 
through) or externally generated (try it out). 
Theoretical and experimental support for the notion of 
potentiality states in creative cognition comes from work on 
concept combination. A mathematical model of concepts 
that includes potentiality states as a central notion accurately 
predicts the shifts in applicabilities of properties of concepts 
when they are placed in different contexts (Aerts & Gabora, 
2005a,b). Experiments on concept combination 
(summarized in Ward & Kolomytz, 2010) show that the 
more dissimilar the contributing concepts, the more original, 
yet potentially the less practical, the resulting idea. This 
suggests that the more ill-defined the unborn idea, the 
greater the extent to which it exists in a state of potentiality, 
and the more processing it requires to become viable. Real-
time studies of artists and designers indicate that creative 
ideation involves elaborating on a ‘kernel idea’ which goes 
from ill-defined to well-defined through an interaction 
between artist and artwork (Locher, 2010; Tovey & Porter, 
2003; Weisberg, 2004). This too is highly consistent with 
the notion of potentiality states.  
Theories of Analogy 
In tests of analogy solving, the target is presented as a 
problem that can be solved drawing from the source (Gick 
& Holyoak, 1983). It is believed that the source tacitly 
informs the participant, prompting a solution. We now 
summarize a preeminent theory of how this happens known 
as structure mapping. We then present an alternative that 
involves the resolution of cognitive states of potentiality. 
Structure Mapping 
Structure mapping, in its original formulation, posits that 
analogy generation occurs in two steps (Gentner, 1983). The 
first step involves finding an appropriate source in memory 
and aligning it with the target. The second step involves 
mapping the correct one-to-one correspondences between 
the source and the target. Thus structure mapping assumes 
that once the correct source is found, the analogy making 
process occurs in isolation from the rest of the contents of 
the mind. A key principle of structure mapping is the 
systematicity principle, according to which people prefer to 
connect structures composed of related predicates.  
According to more recent formulation of the theory, the 
process occurs in three stages (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 
1995; Gentner, 2010). The first stage entails finding all 
possible source-to-target matches through a quick and dirty 
process that emphasizes surface similarity. Structural 
alignment and mapping occur in the second and third stages. 
An ‘Actualization of Potential’ View of Analogy 
While we believe that the basic principles of structure 
mapping are sensible and well-supported, we call into 
question some of its underlying assumptions. First, we 
propose that the first phase is not, as Gentner (2010) puts it, 
a “structurally blind free-for-all” (p. 753) but rather, 
constrained by content-addressable structure of associative 
memory to naturally retrieve items that are in some way 
(although not necessarily the right or most relevant way) 
structurally similar (Gabora, 2010). A related assumption 
we call into question is that alignment and mapping work 
with discrete, predefined structures. We propose that a ‘half-
baked’ analogy exists in a state of potentiality due to the 
phenomenon of creative interference. The source may be an 
amalgam of multiple items that have previously been 
encoded to the neural cell assemblies activated by the target, 
and that in the present context cannot be readily separated 
from one another. The analogy is in a potentiality state 
because relevant aspects of these items have not yet been 
disambiguated from aspects that are irrelevant.  
Contrasting the Predictions of Structure Mapping 
versus Actualizing Potentiality 
We have examined two theories concerning the creative 
process of analogy making. Structure mapping is related to 
search/selection theories of creativity in emphasizing the 
challenge of finding a suitable predefined structure. In 
contrast, according to the ‘actualization of potentiality’ 
view, because of the distributed, content-addressable 
structure of associative memory, suitable pre-defined 
structures come to mind for free, not as separate and discrete 
items but merged together, and the challenge is dis-
entangling the relevant from the irrelevant.  
The two theories give different predictions as to the state 
of the mind midway through analogy formation. This is 
schematically illustrated in Figure 1. Structure mapping 
predicts that early on, multiple distinct and separate sources 
may be identified. Eventually an appropriate source is 
chosen, but the analogy is still unfinished because not all the 
correspondences between source and target have been 
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found. There is no reason to expect that the incomplete 
solution will contain extra material. 
According to the ‘actualization of potentiality’ view, 
however, the incomplete solution is expected to contain 
extra material that would perhaps be correct for similar 
problems but that is not appropriate for this one. The 
unfinished solution is ill-defined because irrelevant 
characteristics of the contributing sources have not yet been 
disambiguated from characteristics that are relevant.  
 
 Structure Mapping Actualization of 
Potentiality 
Early 
 Sources        Target   Source       Target  
Late 
 Source       Target   Source       Target  
Complete 
 Source       Target  Source       Target 
 
Figure 1. Highly simplified illustration of the relevant 
differences between analogy solving by structure mapping 
versus by actualization of potentiality. 
 
Note that for completed analogies it is not possible to 
distinguish which theory provides a better explanation of 
how the analogy was produced. Only for incomplete 
analogies do the two theories give different predictions. 
Method 
We now examine an experimental test of the hypothesis 
that midway through analogy problem solving the mind is in 
a state of potentiality. In the following experiment, a 
procedure that involves stopping participants midway 
through a problem solving session and asking them what 
they are thinking (Bower, Farvolden, & Mermigis, 1995), 
was adapted to analogy problem solving. 
Participants 
Eighty-five University of British Columbia 
undergraduates who were taking first year psychology 
course participated in the experiment. They received course 
credit for their participation.  
Materials and Procedures 
The source and target for this analogy solving experiment 
are, respectively, The General, and the Radiation Problem, 
commonly used one-paragraph-long stories in the analogy 
literature (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). The General involves a 
fortress that cannot be captured if all soldiers come from the 
same direction but that can be successfully captured by 
dividing the army into small groups of soldiers that 
converge on the fortress from multiple directions. (The story 
is provided in Appendix A). The Radiation Problem 
involves finding a way to destroy a tumor without killing 
surrounding tissue. (The story is provided in Appendix B). 
The solution to the Radiation Problem is analogous to the 
solution to The General; the tumor is destroyed using 
multiple low-intensity X-rays from different directions. 
The experimental procedure consisted of the following: 
Phase One In the first phase, the exposure to source 
phase, the participants were given five minutes to study The 
General. They were asked to summarize the story as a test 
of their story comprehension.  
Phase Two In the second phase, the problem solving 
phase, the participants were presented with the target, the 
Radiation Problem. They were given no indication that the 
story from phase one could help them solve the problem. 
Since pilot studies showed that the minimum time required 
to solve the Radiation problem is two minutes, the 
participants were interrupted after 100 seconds and told they 
had 20 seconds to write down whatever they were currently 
thinking in terms of a solution.  
Followup In a questionnaire distributed immediately 
afterward participants were asked whether they noticed a 
relation between The General and The Radiation Problem, 
and if so, at what point they noticed it. 
Judging 
Results of both phases were assessed by six judges who 
were naïve as to the theoretical rationale for the experiment. 
The story summaries produced in phase one were judged for 
comprehension on a three-point scale: poor, fair, or good.  
Since we were interested in the nature of cognitive states 
midway through a creative process, participants who 
correctly solved the problem in the allotted time were 
removed from the analysis (N = 34). They were deemed to 
have correctly solved the problem if they found all three of 
the correspondences provided in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: The necessary correspondences for a complete 
analogical solution. 
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The General (Source) Radiation Problem 
(Target) 
1. Multiple groups of soldiers 1. Multiple rays 
2. Small groups 2. Low intensity 
3. Groups converge from 
different directions 
3. Rays converge from   
different directions 
 
The judges were asked to categorize each of the 
remaining incomplete solutions as either Structure Mapping 
(SM) or Actualization of Potentiality (AP) according to the 
characteristics of each provided in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Characteristics used to judge incomplete analogy 
solutions as Structure Mapping (SM) versus Actualization 
of Potentiality (AP). 
 
Structure Mapping (SM) Actualization of 
Potentiality (AP) 
1. If multiple solutions are 
given they are considered 
separate and distinct (for 
example, separated by the 
word ‘or’)  
1. If multiple solutions are 
given they are jumbled 
together  
2. Does not contain extra, 
irrelevant information 
2. Contains extra 
information that would 
be relevant for related 
problems but that is not 
relevant for this one 
 
A potential concern at this point is that an answer might 
contain extraneous information because it was elaborated 
following retrieval, rather than because of creative 
interference. There is evidence that analogy making does in 
some cases involve adapting or elaborating the source to 
improve the match (e.g. Ross, 1987). Structure mapping 
does not emphasize this kind of adaptation or elaboration, 
but it allows for and is not incompatible with it. However, in 
the analogy used here, no adapting or elaborating of the 
source was needed to generate a complete and correct 
solution. In other words, if the correct source (The General 
story) was found, it could be used as is, without elaboration. 
Therefore, if extraneous information is present we have 
good reason to believe that it was due to creative 
interference.  
An example of an answer that was categorized as 
structure mapping (SM) is:  
 
“No idea. Don’t know much about science. Maybe try to 
have a low-intensity ray that would sufficiently kill the 
tumor but not destroy healthy tissues.”  
 
In this answer, one of correspondences has been found 
(correspondence 2: low intensity ray). Since the other two 
correspondences were not found (multiple rays and different 
directions) the solution is incomplete. Since the answer 
provides no evidence that the participant’s current 
conception of a solution consists of multiple items jumbled 
together in memory, it was classified as SM.  
We now present two examples of answers that were 
categorized as AP. The first example is:  
 
“First, what kind of tissue will be destroyed with the ray 
treatment? Can it be replaced using skin graft? How much 
tissue will be destroyed in the surrounding area? Will the 
cost outweigh the benefit? This needs to be considered if 
using the full strength ray.”  
 
In this incomplete solution, none of the three 
correspondences has been found. However, the phrase “if 
using the full strength ray” indicates that the participant has 
considered, or is about to consider, the possibility of using a 
ray that is less than full strength, which suggests that 
correspondence 2 is within reach. It was classified as AP 
because it includes irrelevant information (such as concern 
about the kind of tissue) activated by the target that is 
unnecessary to generation of the correct solution. 
A second example of an answer that was categorized as 
AP is the following: 
 
“The high intensity ray is necessary to kill the tumor so 
maybe shooting it in short successive bursts from 
different angles will kill the tumor without killing too 
much healthy tissue.” 
 
In this incomplete solution, one of the correspondences 
has been found: different directions (correspondence 3). It 
was classified as AP because it also includes irrelevant 
information (the notion of “short successive bursts”) 
activated by the target that is unnecessary to generation of 
the correct solution. 
Results 
The intraclass correlation for the degree of agreement 
concerning ratings of story comprehension across the judges 
was .704, which indicates that they are reliable. 36 
participants responded that they saw a relation between the 
story and the problem, and 15 said they did not. A Kruskal-
Wallis test was conducted to determine whether there was 
an interaction between the poor, fair, and good ratings of 
story comprehension, and which theory was supported by a 
particular incomplete analogy. The test was not significant, 
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χ2(2,N = 50) = 3.65, p = .16, r = .27. This indicates that 
there was no interaction between story comprehension and 
which theory was supported by a response. 
Each of the 51 incomplete solutions (those that remained 
after complete solutions were removed from the analysis) 
was classified as supportive of structure mapping if 4 or 
more judges judged it as structure mapping, and as 
supportive of actualizing potentiality if 4 or more judges 
judged it as actualizing potentiality. In cases where judging 
was tied (N = 8) random number generation was used to 
assign case values. As shown in Figure 2, 39 were classified 
as supportive of actualizing potentiality, and 12 were 
classified as supportive of structure mapping. A one-sample 
chi-square test was significant, χ2(1,N = 50) = 1.43, p < 
.001. Thus the frequency count data support the hypothesis 
that analogies are generated by actualizing potentiality.  
 
 
Figure 2: (a) Frequency count of solution judgments for 
structure mapping (SM), on the left (N = 12) and 
actualization of potentiality (AP), on the right (N = 39). (b) 
Mean number of ratings of SM, on the left (M = 1.65, SD 
=1.66) and AP, on the right (M = 4.35, SD =1.66). 
 
A further analysis compared the mean number of 
judgments (out of a maximum of 6, the total number of 
judges) across all responses that supported each theory. 
Taking the mean across all 51 responses, the mean number 
of structure mapping judgments was 1.65 (SD =1.66), and 
the mean number of actualizing potentiality judgments was 
4.35 (SD =1.66). A paired-sample t-test showed that the 
difference was significant t(50) = -5.82, p < .001), and the 
effect size (η2 = .25) was large. Thus these data corroborate 
the above frequency count findings. The mean judgment 
scores for structure mapping and actualizing potentiality are 
given in Figure 2b. 
Discussion 
Although framed as an alternative to structure mapping, 
the data presented here are not incompatible with its key 
principles of structural alignment, systematicity, and 
mapping. However, we propose that the sparse, distributed, 
content-addressable structure of associative memory ensures 
that any item that comes to mind as a potential source bears 
some structural similarity (deep or superficial) to the target. 
Thus the initial stage of analogy solving is viewed as not 
structurally blind, but confused due to the multitude of 
potentially relevant structures that present themselves. Due 
to the phenomenon of creative interference, what comes to 
mind may be quite unlike anything that has ever been 
experienced. Both the data from frequency counts and mean 
number of SM versus AP judgments support the prediction 
that a half-baked analogy exists in a state of potentiality, in 
which the constituent items are merged together, as opposed 
to a collection of candidate items each in the separate and 
distinct form in which they were originally encoded in 
memory. The vagueness or ‘half-baked’ quality reflects that 
it is still uncertain how, in the context of each other, these 
elements come together as a realizable whole. 
A limitation of the current study is that it only involved 
one analogy-solving task. Future studies will investigate the 
role of potentiality states in other analogy solving tasks, as 
well as other kinds of creative processes, and in human 
cognition more generally.  
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Appendix A: The General 
The following story, referred to as The General, was used 
as the source in this analogy solving experiment: 
 
A small country was ruled from a strong fortress by a 
dictator. The fortress was situated in the middle of the 
country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads 
led to the fortress through the countryside. A rebel general 
vowed to capture the fortress. The general knew that an 
attack by his entire army would capture the fortress. He 
gathered his army at the head of one of the roads, ready to 
launch a full-scale direct attack. However, the general 
then learned that the dictator had planted mines on each of 
the roads. The mines were set so that small bodies of men 
could pass over them safely, since the dictator needed to 
move his troops and workers to and from the fortress. 
However, any large force would detonate the mines. Not 
only would this blow up the road, but it would also 
destroy many neighboring villages. It therefore seemed 
impossible to capture the fortress. However, the general 
devised a simple plan. He divided his army into small 
groups and dispatched each group to the head of a 
different road. When all was ready he gave the signal and 
each group marched down a different road. Each group 
continued down its road to the fortress so that the entire 
army arrived together at the fortress at the same time. In 
this way, the general captured the fortress and overthrew 
the dictator. 
Appendix B: The Radiation Problem 
The following story, referred to as The Radiation 
Problem, was used as the target in this experiment. 
 
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a 
malignant tumor in his stomach. It is impossible to 
operate on the patient, but unless the tumor is destroyed 
the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that can be used 
to destroy the tumor. If the rays reach the tumor all at 
once at a sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will be 
destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy 
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tissue that the rays pass through on the way to the tumor 
will also be destroyed. At lower intensities the rays are 
harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not affect the 
tumor either. What type of procedure might be used to 
destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the same time 
avoid destroying the healthy tissue? 
